Jules Gill-Peterson: I really wanted to make the most of this lecture's occasion. To me, it felt very special. As I thought about it, I just really wanted to be frank with all of you about the political attack on the freedom to transition in this country or really the freedom of transsexuals to change our sex. Less than a year since the disastrous Supreme Court decision in US versus Skrmetti, I'd plan to talk to you about the history of the Equal Protection Clause. The historic role of a formerly enslaved woman, Francis Thompson, who was born male, transitioned as a child under slavery and framed the adoption of the 14th Amendment in 1866 by testifying to Congress. But as I was preparing this lecture, I hit on a very uncomfortable truth. I'd been planning on tracing the political history of trans misogyny, the root of all anti transgender sentiment, if you ask me, which I really believe emerged as a political force in this country in the 1870s, when Southern reactionaries viciously attacked Francis Thompson's transition to attack reconstruction. In other words, I'd been planning to examine with you the political history of conservatism, and it's very tempting given how the majority opinion in Skrmetti as well, represents one anti transgender strand in contemporary conservatism. But the more I've sat with this history, the more I've come to the inescapable conclusion that analyzing conservatism in isolation is ultimately an exercise in wish fulfillment. It's much easier to place blame on your most honest enemy. I'm concerned about how deeply we idealize our own presumed beliefs and politics by pulling conservatives apart piece by piece. If you really want to know why I think we lost Skrmetti and what it means for the future of medical transition, we've got to talk about liberalism, because the history of transgender identity and politics are fundamentally part of the history of American liberalism, not conservatism. Liberalism set the conditions for Skrmetti, but it set them many decades ago, long before conservatives had the scarcest idea that they could pan campaign against transsexual youth. I have a little confession to make. I actually shelved my entire planned lecture last weekend and started over. It did help that I wrote a book about this subject, though. But I really felt I needed to say something different tonight. I won't recap the series of events that have brought us to today, but it's my conviction that transgender politics, as we know them, are actually by design and capable of confronting the political attack on transition. The pivotal advantage of anti transgender politics is that they merge two targets into one. They go after transition itself. Banking on the old fashioned unpopularity of transsexuals and so healthcare, gender self identification, and all the basic bread and butter components of transition are now in peril. It's really hard to imagine a more literal case of punching down. But conservatives also campaign against transgender as a synonym for liberal elitism. They charge that gender ideology is imposed from the top down on ordinary people by out of touch academics, bureaucrats, or doctors and in this line of attack, transgender doesn't represent a vulnerable minority. It represents the honestly very unpopular managerial style of liberalism. I just think this has caught a lot of people off guard. By a lot of people, I mean Americans with a college degree, who I shall put to you tonight have some interests involved concealing the real tensions within transgender identity and politics. Conservatism does scape out transsexuals. Believe me, I get it in my email inbox, but it fuses that moral crusade with a genuinely populist critique of liberalism, with its bland adoration of wonky technocrats, its passant for elitist academic jargon, and its vision of progress that mainly benefits college educated professionals. It's perhaps tempting, at this point to retreat into the idea that, well, we could separate liberals from leftists, and I suspect that temptation could be particularly well anchored here in Berkeley. If you read the scholarship and transgender studies, you'll see that division is simply assumed. But I don't buy it for reasons I'll put to you tonight. As was mentioned, I co wrote an amicus brief submitted on behalf of US historians to the Supreme Court in US versus Skrmetti. We famously lost that case, but I'll point out we actually lost it exactly how critics predicted we would lose. Conservative justices took advantage of the real contradictions internal to transgender identity and politics. Which is namely the contradiction between defining transgender immaterially as an effect of personal identification or personal expression versus the real practices by which people change their sex to solve the unimaginable suffering of dysphoria, which requires medical care. Now, in the majority opinion, Chief Justice Roberts twists and contorts the jurisprudence on sex discrimination into a ridiculous nightmarish mess. Yes, that is true. But he also used the plaintiff's own arguments against them because transgender and transsexual really don't

have the same interests, and he did that very easily. Did the other conservative justices, especially Amy Coney Barrett in her concurrence. I wouldn't have said this a year ago, but to be honest with you, I think everything about Skrmetti was cowardly. The choice by the Biden administration to take the case to the Supreme Court in the first place, I think, was cowardly. The arrogance of donors in the LGBT nonprofit sector, some of the professional class liberals who trained their whole careers to create transgender rights ended up ignoring the critics within their own ranks, even within the legal profession, who warned that the case was likely to be a fool's errand. Then there's the gall, the gall to use transgender platitudes as a legal argument to protect transsexual children. The insulting demand, frankly, from day one of oral arguments that we're supposed to celebrate the occasion of the first openly transgender lawyer to argue in front of the Supreme Court as if the fact that we sent him in to lose a pivotal case wasn't proof that transgender visibility is a direct attack on transsexual people's lives. We can analyze the twists and turns of the conservative mind in the court's decisions and concurrences. But to be honest with you, there's not a lot to be revealed there. Conservatives are quite honest about the motives and aims of their anti transgender campaigns. I think it was our cowardice as middle class people that made Skrmetti an exercise in tragedy because it involved a lot of denial about the losing strategy we employed. It was the cowardice of what I would term in my next book, transgender liberalism. For you see the historical root of transgender identity in politics lie with people who tried and failed to rationalize away their dysphoria, hoping against all hope not to have to change their sex. I think ultimately, unfortunately, that makes for a very unhealthy approach to life, not to mention a very unhealthy politics. The word transgender was coined by middle class cross dressers roughly in the 1960s and 1970s, and that's a few decades before non profits academics and liberal advocates sent it mainstream in the 90s. But the historical emergence of transgender identity took place a little bit earlier in the 1930s. During the Great Depression, transvestites, as they called themselves, turned their personal cross dressing into a private culture, throwing discreet parties in their homes and carrying on long correspondences with one another. This secretive middle class converted the personal wish not to have to change sex into a group identity. Cross dressing instead of transitioning, allowed them to stay married men, work white collar jobs or run businesses, and receive the many blessings of the liberal state, which, of course, structured the economy around male breadwinners. Transvestites began to speak metaphorically in the 1930s about their peculiar practice as if they had two personalities inside. Their heterosexual male side predominated, not just legally and physically, but in the public world, and their feminine side could only come out in the safety of the private sphere. Some even began to speak of having a brother and a sister living within. Transgender identity was from the very beginning, a strategy for middle class people tormented by dysphoria to avoid the risks and the rewards of changing sex. If transvestites had been content merely to rationalize their dysphoria, well, then transgender identity wouldn't have become more than a bourgeois affectation. But the social predicament of dysphoria was not so easily contained. It was the dramatic and public difficulty of changing sex for those who dare to try that politicized transgender identity. As transvestites knew all too well, transition carries massive personal risks, but not equally for everyone. For people born female, becoming a man usually created upward mobility in the 19th and 20th centuries. Blue collar work, especially paid better than typical women's jobs. Life as a man. Also, remember, conferred real legal rights and a lot of social esteem. But for people born male, becoming a woman had catastrophic consequences. Transsexual women struggled to find work because they rarely passed as female without medical assistance, and they were vulnerable to arrest for cross dressing. Many of them fell back on sex work in working class gay neighborhoods because it was the only place in the world their femininity was valued. As their plight dramatized for everyone else, changing sex could cause life defining insecurity. In a sex segregated and racially stratified labor market, where men and women did different kinds of work and men earned higher wages than women, the process of transitioning was a series of serious dilemmas. Most transsexuals, whether they were becoming women or men, had to drop out of high school just to create enough autonomy to change their clothes and names. Being disowned by family was routine. To bury the past, most of them had to move very far away from home, starting over in a world of strangers. Even if they did

start passing, it took skill and determination to avoid being found out and changing sex. This is the boring but crucial part almost always required finding work in an unfamiliar sector of the labor market. These were the practicalities and the stakes that confronted transition even before contemplating how to obtain hormones or surgeries to make that change physically. The different ways that people responded to transition's fundamental insecurity were more than anything else, a product of class. Becoming a woman was a disastrous economic decision, making transsexual women poorer regardless of their class background. Becoming a man usually meant the inverse. However, it also meant settling for a blue collar way of life with the wear and tear all working men endured. Transvestites jealously guarded their middle class careers and families because they saw how often transsexual women risked everything to transition and still came up short, stuck in a degrading and unlivable place in between the sexes. It was this abject consequence of transsexuality's insecurity that charged transgender identity with political significance. Cross dressing was an individual alternative to transition, but transgender politics sought solutions for society for this insecurity triggered by transition. Middle class transvestites partnered with the welfare state and medicine beginning in the 1940s to tackle transitions insecurity from a shared set of liberal values. Again, transvestites felt deeply invested in this problem because they stood to lose so much if they ever gave in to their wish to change sex. They set out with doctors and liberal reformers to solve the plight of the transsexual woman, but they tried to solve it through self restraint, hard work, and individual responsibility. In doing so, transgender identity transformed itself into a fully fledged political worldview deserving of the name transgender liberalism. In fact, the transgender branch of liberalism was so successful that it simply displaced all other political analysis of how to solve the life altering security of changing sex. There are two core values that I think define transgender liberalism to this day. First, it assumes that the risks of changing sex ought to be personal responsibilities. Two, it pushes transgender identity over transsexuality as the superior choice for dealing with dysphoria. In fact, and this probably sounds strange, those are the values that informed and created the field of transgender medicine in the United States. When Christine Jorgensen made front page news in 1952 for having changed her sex, transvestites did not keep their distance from her as you might expect. Yes, they vigorously rejected medical sex change for themselves, but cross-dressers like Louise Lawrence got involved with the original researchers and clinicians in this new medical specialty. I think the reason was that downwardly mobile, impoverished transsexual women formed a highly visible urban underclass in many American cities in the 1950s. They had washed out of a booming labor market and the dominant middle-class culture in the country. These young women and girls were framed by mid-century liberals as a problem population in need of rehabilitation, along with hustlers, drug users, and other runaway youth. In fact, actually, they were among the few white people in the United States to experience a decline in income during a period of rising tides. The medical diagnosis of transsexuality and its treatment were actually mainly shaped by economic imperatives, not medical ones. Transvesits had a vested interest in the fate of these transsexuals because the two groups were linked, not just in the public eye, but by a relationship of class. Transvestiits were stricken by the fear that if they ever gave in to their wish to transition, they would end up in the underclass. But they also shared a paternalistic, liberal perspective with doctors and welfare state officials on what should be done about these poor women. Extremely narrow diagnostic criteria and a qualification period for surgery drawn out over years allowed clinicians to demand that poor women alter their behavior, obtain remedial education, and complete their job training to exit the underclass first in exchange for medical care. This long probationary period was given the name by psychiatrists of the real-life test. It amounted to holding medical care ransom. It made clear that transition was only justifiable if it served a higher civic purpose and if it cost society as little as possible. Medicine set out to rehabilitate transsexual women on behalf of the state so that patients could lift themselves out of dependency on sex work and welfare. If they would not settle for cross-dressing, then transsexuals had to rejoin society as self-reliant women workers first before they got to transition. Of course, most transsexual women wanted nothing more than to escape life on the street. They really did need rehabilitation, but asking them to individually repair the structural insecurity

triggered by the accident of their dysphoria was a cruel and foolish policy. A group of university-based gender clinics opened across the country in the second half of the 1960s to test this hypothesis that surgical sex change could improve economic outcomes in the underclass. I think Stanford University's clinic, which was founded by plastic surgeon Donald Lab and psychiatrist Norman Fisk, was by far the most important, probably the most important clinic in the world in the history of this field, actually, because it opened in the shadow of a political experiment in San Francisco's Tenderloin. There, federal grants under Lyndon B. Johnson administration's war on poverty funded a short-lived effort led by police officers, psychiatrists, Protestant ministers, and bureaucrats to rehabilitate the Tenderloins underclass. This experiment, I think, really minted transgender liberalism's vision for healthcare and welfare. The state really tried for several years, taking poor women off the sex work stroll, and they hoped one day off welfare rolls in exchange for psychiatrically supervised access to hormones and surgery, which they hoped Stanford would eventually be able to provide. They pushed hardest for transsexual women to become independent through work, and their experiment failed. Women reported being so much happier after vaginoplasty, but it did not lift them out of poverty. The failure of these clinics to solve transsexual women's insecurity came at a pivotal crossroad. Double-digit inflation ate into people's wages, and accelerating deindustrialization devastated the labor market in the early 1970s, plunging the family model of breadwinner liberalism into a crisis. This university gender clinic system was also buckling under the exorbitant costs of trying to rehabilitate transsexual women and failing. In the 1970s, transgender medicine deregulated, like many other sectors of the economy. In 1973, Fisk and Laub introduced gender dysphoria syndrome, which is an umbrella delic diagnosis. It's the basis of the one we still use today that they had developed at Stanford. Liberalizing the diagnostic criteria allowed clinicians to give up the silly question of who was a true transsexual. Instead, they could redouble their efforts at financial efficiency and outcome data. As a syndrome, gender dysphoria welcomed anyone who sincerely sought hormones and surgeries, including cross-stressors. Middle class transvestes had actually been previously disqualified for medical transition, but now they were welcome at Stanford. Although transvestates often had more difficulty passing than poor women, they just didn't require much rehabilitation. They tended to be older, better educated. They'd begun careers as white men. Their lives were quite stable. They could pay for surgery, especially without needing to do sex work, as they began medically transitioning, joined soon by transsexual men, a new middle class leapfrogged right over the underclass, displacing the population for whom the gender clinics and the very concept of transsexuality had been created. This is the basis of our transgender healthcare system today. More than anything else, I would say transgender liberalism came into its own as a hostile solution to the devastating downward mobility that engulfs poor transsexual women. A rehabilitative protocol for making them female did develop, but it was hamstrung at every turn by its own transgender values. Because if you go and read all the published work, including this very important journal article, you'll see the ultimate hope of all the psychiatrists and surgeons who opened these clinics was that sex change surgery would eventually be proven unnecessary. The doctors and welfare state officials who built this medical system agreed with transvestits that the best outcome in general would be for people afflicted with the desire to change sex to learn to manage their suffering without hormones and surgery. I just think that was an unimaginably cruel approach, but we've gotten very used to it. Ironically, though this is only on the surface ironic, over time, because of the class basis of the patient profile they wanted, transgender medicine abandoned poor transsexual women for the very middle-class patients who spent so much time and energy claiming it was nobler not to transition until they gave in and did it anyways. Of course, going through a denialist period before transitioning didn't make any of these people unusual. The wish not to be a transsexual is ultimately a self preserving one, even if it is self-hating. The common dissociative response to the hell of gender dysphoria also has a natural ally in intellectualization, which middle-class education endows with near limitless resources. As transgender partisans knew all too well, dysphoria can be fatal if left unchecked, tipping over into asphyxiating estrangement from your own flesh and the outside world simultaneously. Suicidal ideation is less a transsexual pathology than the only way for the most desperate soul to escape dysphoria's crushing

unfulfillment over time. The only way that is when transition feels impossible. In a liberal political economy, where trying to change sex can mean losing family, friends, jobs, and basic stability. The pressures bearing down on people to justify why they shouldn't transition are nothing short of extreme. But what my research has taught me is that to politicize those rationalizations is another matter entirely. I think only a very comfortable position in the professional class shielded transgender leaders from greater consequences for their harmful beliefs and actions. Here's the weird thing. As I realized at the end of my book, when I was finishing writing it, practically every single evangelist of transgender values from middle class cross dressers like Louise Lawrence and Virginia Prince, to the 1980s architects of the transgender umbrella, like Marisa Cheryl Ln or Kate Bornstein, to 1990s transgender butchers like Pat Klifia All eventually broke their own cardinal rules and transitioned.me, like Lou Sullivan, freely admitted to having spent years torturing himself, trying to be a cross dresser, before finding peace in hormones and surgery. Yet, not one of them ever recanted their transgender politics. Why should they have? Whatever the personal costs, their worldview had the wind in its sails, and transsexuals cannot say the same. By the end of the 20th century, the transgender approach to identity became popular enough to appeal to people without gender dysphoria. I mean, it's an almost shocking achievement, except that the transgender impulse has always been to run away from pain and end novelty. The rationalization of dysphoria always needs new justifications and new proposals for what might finally make an unhappy person happy. Transgenderism, as it used to be called, became successful the more it turned ecumenical, absorbing other middle-class identities and consumer practices that led even further away from the devastating problem of sex change. Where it had once been the personal rationale of cross dresses, transgender began the 21st century unleashed as a metaphor in art, performance, academic philosophy, leisure, fashion, liberal feminism, sexual liberalism. You know what I'm talking about. No one could be prouder of that big tent than whoever wanted proof that they did not have to become a transsexual after all. The growth in the transgender flock beyond people stricken with dysphoria was also, I think, a historical threshold. New recruits to the cause who were not suppressing a deep-rooted conflict inside of themselves were able to carry its liberal faith in individual salvation much further. I think, actually, transgender identity contributed to liberalism, the definition of freedom that has become dominant in the past few decades, the right to be yourself. But in its cross-dresser roots, it also foreshadowed the terrible emptiness of that freedom because being free to choose who you are, even in its most creative manifestations, is to fashion a self out of the impersonal products of consumer culture or abstract ideas. This was the existential fear that transvestites had to face every single time they got dressed. Did intense commitment to the right skirts, blouses, hosiery, heels, cosmetics, hair products, jewellery, cigarettes, and manners make them feel like real women? Or did the art of female impersonation, as Virginia Prince termed it, make them feel like imposters? The cross-dressers' embrace of self actualization, which simply rhymed with American culture in general, didn't really result in ecstatic satisfaction or even contentment, and I don't think it brought about a relaxed state of androgyny, as new age proponents claimed. If anything, I think the transgender approach stoked a restless imposter syndrome that sat upon a barely sublimated class conflict. In recent decades, the professional class has tried on new gender and sexual identities in a frenzy, playing with style and language. But because they rely on working-class transsexuals for the masculinity and femininity that they imitate, they never feel as authentic as transgender politics promised that they would feel. This requires redoubling every effort to forge more promising identities, to push harder to include every new gender that can be invented out of thin air to fill the space under the proverbial umbrella. But most of these innovations only recycle their predecessors with the cleverness furnished by university education. Bi-gendered gave way to gender queer, which in turn gave way to non binary, transgender, gave way to trans and even spawned a hypothetical opposite in cisgender, which then became cis. But no neologism could ever quiet the anxious impulse behind its coinage. Decades before personal computing and the World Wide Web morphed into the obligate Internet of social media. Transgenderism promised deliverance through perfectly individualized identity, only to intensify the growing condition of loneliness in post-industrial society. Transgender liberalism's greatest sin, no doubt, rests with the generations of people who

have prolonged their suffering by politicizing the wish not to have to change their sex. But even that misses the full scale of its impact. Transgender values, I really think have made a distinct impression on American liberalism. The transgender vision of a defiantly expressive, but anxious middle class reinforced the identity politics, capturing the nonprofit sector, higher education, healthcare, a lot of the corporate world, and transgender values, which I think at their core remain crossdresser values, now today shape the expectations, experiences, and conduct of people from many walks of life. It's true they're still concentrated among people who have attended university, but as college-educated people took the reins of the Democratic Party and the information economy, they pushed very hard to enlighten society in their own image. The profound dislike of transsexuals actually only convinced liberals of the righteousness of their cause. Part of the appeal of transgender identity is no doubt the thrill for middle class people to imagine that they are endangered and brave like poor transsexual women. If, as some political historians have suggested, the election of Barack Obama in 2008 signaled the electoral zenith of professional class liberalism, then I think transgender liberalism ran slightly behind that curve. This was actually quite helpful when liberalism racked up a string of pretty brutal political and economic defeats while claiming victory in the sphere of culture. It was not until 2016 during the Democratic Convention to nominate Hillary Clinton for president that transgender liberalism made its national electoral debut in a speech delivered by party insider Sarah McBride. But just as quickly as the transgender tipping point was declared on the cover of Time magazine, it seemed to prove a Mirage, and to some liberals, a mistake. Less than a decade after her speech, McBride became the first openly transgender person elected to Congress. But the right-wing populism that put Donald Trump back in the White House also campaigned fiercely on putting an end to transgender ideology because it represented the worst tendencies of the status quo. Liberals were left scratching their heads. Just as Democrats discovered that transgender politics were, whether they liked it or not, a core element of American liberalism, they struggled to comprehend the fact that conservatives had apparently figured it out before them. Ultimately, the events through which transgender politics shape 21st century liberalism and energize conservatism are just too complex and also unfinished for me to get into any further. My point is simply that transgender history is bound first and foremost to the history of liberalism, that you cannot be disentangled, which explains why there's no history of transgender conservatism or transgender leftism to speak of in this country. I think transgender history really helps us understand how liberalism has changed over the past 100 years. As a bunch of political historians have noted, liberalism wasn't exactly sabotaged by resurgent conservatives beginning in the 1960s, nor did it degrade from a shiny New Deal or civil rights ideal into that awful corrupted neoliberalism when Ronald Reagan was elected. Liberals, let's remind ourselves, were enthusiastic defenders of Jim Crow, welfare reform, spending cuts, Cold War militarism, policing and incarceration all on their own without any help from conservatives. In fact, liberalism transformed itself rather than just caving in to conservative rivals or, I don't know, the Trojan horse of Austrian economics. In other words, liberalism transformed itself over the past 100 years through the ascent of the professional class in American life. My point is merely that a transgender middle class has played a pretty interesting role in that history. Few people drawn to transgender identity today, however, really enjoy the advantages of a male breadwinner who crossdressed in the 1930s or 1950s. In fact, it's kind of a great irony that for all the ways transgender has become the template for identity politics, I don't think transsexuality has lost any of its allure. The transsexuals' basic motive is very easy to understand. It's to find peace in changing sex and then move on. That desire might be thwarted at every turn, but it also persists very powerfully despite almost any headwind. I think however much it disturbs the median voter to imagine the process of changing sex, the grit and determination of transsexual self-reinvention, it's actually arguably quite American. Actually, in the 1950s, Christine Jorgensen herself presented herself as a paradigmatic American who had embraced her definition of the pursuit of happiness against all odds. I think transsexuality remains, despite every transgender platitude, more a temporary status than an identity. I think this was the great insight of mid-century sociologists who studied the social process of changing sex. Many transsexuals today would still like nothing more than to cast off their status at the

end of their transition and enjoy the superb, but quiet victory of living as normal women or men. It's no wonder that social media had to invent the dangerous and all powerful transmedicalist to smear transsexuals who reject transgender values and prioritize solving their dysphoria and the problem it causes. I just think transsexuality remains a wellspring of authenticity that confounds transgender liberalism today, just as it did in the 1940s. Because think about it, dysphoria springs powerfully, but unmistakably from one's physical anatomy. That's the most tangible ground zero of the self, far more concrete than identifying with an external category, concept, or idea of gender. No wonder transgender identity politics has to spend so much of its capital just debating who qualifies for a given identity? Is it valid and who isn't? As Kadji Amin has insightfully observed, the creation of non-binary identity on the Internet offered a solution so perfect to this problem that it unfortunately has no practical value. Non-binary gender is whatever anyone wants it to be individually, which makes it into nothing at all. I think there is a crisis of faith endemic to identification that transsexuality, at its core, outwits. I would submit to you that the political implications of this have been grossly underappreciated. The elite Americans who created transgender identity in politics were some of the best-educated, highest-earning, salaried, and most successful people to live in 20th century America. They really stood to lose a lot if they changed their sex. Yet after years or decades of self-denial, they almost always did. Set in the backdrop of American political and social history, it's not hard to understand why they tried so hard to politicize away their gender dysphoria, even though they couldn't. I feel incredible compassion for that dilemma. Of course, the welfare state, the labor market, and medicine all backed that rationalization. Can the same really be said, though, for most people entertaining a trans or non-binary identity today? If anything, the more popular transgender liberalism has become, the less it's actually reinforced any economic or political interests for its rank and file. The middle class that invented transgender identity has frayed and fragmented as the United States has become a class-polarized postindustrial society in which the rich have gotten very rich at everyone else's expense. The shrinking middle class was already a national preoccupation in the '90s when transgender broke into the mainstream, and now decades later, the professional class is far less secure and far less admired than it was even then. I think it's no coincidence that as transgender liberalism faces a protracted crisis, it's dressed itself up in the very 1960s and 1970s social movements that it replaced, pretending to inherit the mantle of the left. I think it's no coincidence either that academic transgender studies become fixated on poor transsexual women of color for political authenticity. Speaking of transgenders radicalism has mainly to do with the speaker's liberal identity. It signals that someone has an educated perspective on the politics of gender. The retreat from politics, public politics or mass politics into private market-based activities like care or mutual aid, likewise, I think says a lot about transgender scholarships, liberal commitments, and so does the privatization of all human activity into imaginaries or world-building or the constant fight into abstractions like transness that conjure a pleasing metaphysical unity shorn of the divisions and antagonisms of the real world. To me, the basic political statement of transgender studies would seem to be that middle class people's private lives are virtuous models for the rest of the world. Even the pointed absence of Black transsexual women in universities is no problem at all, because the figurative version of Black trans feminism is apparently not for those women. As one scholar in this field takes great pains to stress in an eponymous book, it would apparently be a bad thing if Black trans feminism were so unsophisticated as to defend the actual interests of Black transsexual women. If that is not the definition of elitism, I wouldn't know what is. Let me conclude by returning to where we are today in the political and legal situation created by the Skrmetti case. Given the history I've recounted this evening, you might understand why I would say it's not just conservatives who are uncomfortable with transsexual youth. I think most liberals, I think most lesbian and gay people, I think perhaps even most of the lawyers who are supposed to defend us in court don't really feel comfortable with teenagers taking hormones and having surgeries. Why should they? We have configured transgender politics so gloriously shallow that they are only a matter of belief. If you accept and celebrate transgender children's right to exist, well, then you don't have to contemplate your genuine discomfort with teenagers changing their sex. I think we have been cowards all along to

hide under the umbrella of transgender politics to avoid our own discomfort with dysphoria and changing sex. For liberals and conservatives alike, the uncomfortable question remains, where do transsexual adults like me come from if we weren't transsexual children? My very first memory is of being suicidal in kindergarten because of the sheer torture of dysphoria overwhelming my life. That pain was there before I developed a personality. The fact that I wasn't safe enough to transition without risking death by suicide until adulthood doesn't change the fact that I was a transsexual child. It magnifies it. We have a moral duty to listen to these kids because we have the power to save them from years of traumatic, life-threatening pain and suffering if we let them transition. We can run away from how genuinely frightening that truth is, but we cannot change it. Every attempt to rationalize anti-transsexualism is ultimately sophistry, projection, and naked disregard for one of the worst forms of human suffering that miraculously can be healed. We have to learn to live with that discomfort, that fear, and learn to stop rationalizing the brutality of dysphoria as a predicate for our politics. This is a political crisis, but it's a political crisis within liberalism, within the heart of transgender identity and politics, which have, from their very beginning, been the desperate attempt of unhappy people to try to reason themselves out of transitioning, to bargain with their dysphoria as if such a thing could bring them redemption. Everything I know tells me that it does not. The law, of course, will be a lagging indicator of change in this struggle. We must have the courage, not just to face conservatives who are really, again, very honest about their motives and goals, we need to face ourselves honestly first. We have to stop doing transgender liberalism's to face dirty work. We must find the courage, and I think this is really hard, to defend transsexuals, not trans and non-binary, not transness, not gendered abolition, not any other middle class anti-transsexual diversion. If we seek one day, which I think we should, the security and the goodness of a right to transition, then we have to make it a politically inescapable condition of liberalism so that liberals dare take on conservatives and fight for something good and true for once. Until then, I think we will continue losing because we will be conducting ourselves as losers. But I refuse to be one. I also invite you to join me. Thank you. [Applause]

Christoph Hanssmann: We talked and wanted to make sure there was lots of time for questions because I imagine that people might have some. I just want to say a couple of things that struck me throughout the talk and then maybe ask you a couple of different questions, and then we can turn it over to the audience. First and foremost, the mirror is awkward. This is a moment in which many of us, especially those of us who transitioned in the early 2000s as college educated white trans mass people can recognize some familiarity there. Yet, I think that the charge is really important. I think it's a charge that you and I think many others are ushering into conversations in trend studies that I think is really crucial, and that is what is being called the material turn, which I reject because I think it's been there all along, but it's really been buried. I really appreciate the efforts to bring it to the surface and to really forcefully pull it into the spotlight. Because the centrality of not only a politics of distribution and a politics of materiality are crucial, not only as intellectual practices, but as political ones in this moment, especially. Also, it really lets us understand the forcefulness of the political resistance as rooted in a criminalization of racialized class and trans femininity in general. I think getting very clear about what's going on there feels very important. One detail that I was interested in was and I didn't actually know about this, was the tenderloin experimental project of arranging access to care through the plans of upward mobility and the failures thereof. I was really fascinated by that. I was interested both in the opportunities that are presented in the interstices of erstwhile pathologizing projects, but I'm also interested in the irony of that being possible only through this very Moynihan tangle of pathologies vibe. I think I was especially disappointed to hear that the finale of that story is the leapfrogging of the white transmittal class, both transsexual and transgender figure as nullifying that set of opportunities. That was one thing I wanted to mention too. Then finally, relatedly, I think I really want to think with everyone about this question of harm and what it means to disavow transition as central to trans studies and to trans politics. I think that there's a lot there. I'm interested in the way that it returns us to materialism, not only through the materiality of the body, but also through the materiality of the question of access and the way that transition has always been

available to white, middle, and upwardly mobile professional classes. The tangle of pathologies has really only been applied to a certain set of transsexuals. How do we actually confront these sets of harms through what I would at least like to think of as a deeply coalitional project that is both centered in groups of people that require transition and also that relates to those who don't. I think that brings me to my first question, which is about this figure of the transgender person. I think that the critique of trans liberalism is needed, and it is well placed, and it is crucial. Yet, I'm interested in the kind of historization of transgender because I think in many ways, I'm intrigued by rooting it in the 1930s, cloistered projects and thinking it through towards this moment of the politicizing of distancing from transition 90s. But I think what gets lost in there is the version of what I do think is a transgender leftism, and that's like Les Feinberg, Silvia Rivera was using the term transgender for some time. But especially Feinberg, I want to dwell with that a little bit because I think for my reading of Feinberg's work, is there was actually an effort to think through transgender as a means of distancing from a white transsexual upwardly mobile figure. But more importantly, the effort was to create a really big tent and a coalitional tent and specifically a coalitional tent that was interested in the materiality of socialist solidarity organizing. I wonder I mean, and maybe that's just more of a footnote on the history of transgender, but I wonder if we add that to this conversation and this histocirization, what, if anything, changes?

Jules Gill-Peterson: Fabulous question and happy to Feinberg, I'm happy to say I'm at this point in my career where I write history with characters or recurrent characters in this next book, and you met many of them. Of course, we know many of them. Feinberg is one of them. I think it's time for some reappraisal. You might be surprised to know what people said about Leslie Feinberg in the 1980s. I mean, Feinberg was widely denounced as an anti transsexual propagandist by transsexual men for a 1980 pamphlet called Diary of a transsexual. That was basically a kind of de transition vignette. Had basically talked about having gone into a gender program a little bit like it was like a brainwashing program, and then a moment of freedom being rejecting sex change for the noble, but tragic fate of constantly being hassled for female masculinity, basically. This pamphlet was considered really harmful and really offensive by a lot of transsexual men in the 1980s. It came out a year after Janice Raymond's the transsexual Empire. A lot of people were like, huh. I mean, Feinberg's pamphlet took a harder position against transsexual men than Raymond. Yet Lou Sullivan himself went to a pride parade, saw the Workers' World Party tent where they had copies of this pamphlet and was so enraged. He was like, this is nonsense. Please take these pamphlets off the table, and he was laughed at by these gay men. He was so furious about it. He felt so personally injured by Feinberg's claim that she's like, changing your sex is some kind of capitulation. I think part of what's interesting to me is you go back and read that pamphlet, yeah, despite Feinberg's labor movement history, it's not at all a socialist or material understanding of gender at all. It's a very middle class, very academic idea. It converts, it's a transgender move par excellence, instead of sex change and identity, rooted in a set of beliefs, in this case, that being a non conformist is noble, that it's somehow a good thing to make people uncomfortable and to invite misrecognition and harassment all the time. Some of the pamphlets, later scenes ended up in Stone ***** Blues. I mean, I think, actually, Feinberg is a great example. I don't actually think Feinberg's use of transgender is at all leftist. I think it's actually part of the history through which college educated people having replaced labor based, union driven, and also 1960s and 70s, mass participatory democracy social movements, the kinds where you have to turn out millions of people to achieve your objectives. They're all based on the civil rights movement. It's part of the trajectory where that's replaced by a more sophisticated kind of vanguard who knows better than the rest of society and whose job it is, this is actually a genuine form of progressivism. It's their job to lead the rest of society to imitate them, to reflect their kind of approach. One of the interesting things that I think Feinberg was just an early signal of is a lot of what happened when transgender men appeared as a category in the late 80s and into the 90s, was that because transgender men had come out of this specific history within middle class lesbian feminism, it's always a very small group within the larger world of passing men and transsexual men, like a really small minority. But most passing men and transsexual men just disappear. You never find them. They

don't even talk to each other. You never hear from them. There is this funny selection bias where to this day, people think, yeah most transgender men or transsexual men were lesbians first. No. It's actually a very small proportion. Most of them were not lesbians before they transitioned. We just would never meet them because they actually still blend in really well. They don't have transgender identities. They tend to just be stealth. They become men. I mean, I don't know. It seems like a really great deal. Someone who spent many nights wishing that I wanted to be a man. Anyways, so I think part of what happened, though, is that because they came out of this really mean lesbian feminist tradition, this middle class tradition that just has, like, it's really bad politics, purity politics. Just straight up misandry. Men are evil, penises are evil. This is the source of all evil on Earth. It's like, that's no, that's not true. But part of what happened was when transgender men developed this kind of their version, there had never been female cross dress. There had been, this is Lou Sullivan's whole problem. There was no such thing as a woman who cross dressed as a man. There's no advantage retaining your life as a woman. It's better to become a man. But once the economy had shifted, and there was an advantage, especially for middle class lesbians, not to transition, and also they were treated so badly, for wanting to transition. Oh my God, the mean things people said to transsexual man back in the 80s and the 90s. But as some of them developed this transgender man position, they basically upcycled all these old, really anti male ideas that were also turf ideas. A bubble, it's bad to transition. You can go back, read this stuff in the early 90s. It pollutes the body. It's poisoned. Testosterone very dangerous chemical. You wouldn't want to ruin your pristine, good female body. It's really weird. It's like this whole wellness culture. We should just do not just body-build. Just be a butch. Diaby, this was all real. I think part of what happened was that one, I think that caused a lot of suffering, honestly. I really don't think it made people happy. I know it didn't I write about them in the book because I read their private letters to other people where they talk about how unhappy they were. But also, it really gave license to anti transsexual propagandists who were like, look, duh, you don't need to become a man. You can just dress up as one sometimes or be more butcher, take a more active role in your sex life. Transsexuality is a fraud. It's not necessary. In fact I think men were used to really give that belief a lot more mileage than it had ever gotten before. Unfortunately, I think Leslie Feinberg is a part of that history, not like in a conspiratorial sense, just in an actual historical sense. That's one thing that I think really helps us understand what my historical argument is trying to say here, it's not like my personal opinion. I mean, obviously, it might concord with my own opinions. But it's a real observed fact, that we move from an era where the left, like, yes, Silvia Rivera, the politics of very few transsexual activist organizations in the 70s where they tried to do real genuine mass participatory democracy, but they were just too poor, too exhausted, too policed, completely pushed out of gay liberation by gays and lesbians. A lot of them where their lives ended up was really sad, very tragic. What replaced them was transgender politics, which, again, I would put it this way in the framework of US political history. Transgender politics, as professional class politics are anti populist. They have somewhat of a suspicion of the people, of majority of working class people. You can trace this back to really more boring, wonky versions, but let me throw one name out that's like Ralph Nader. Go back to Ralph Nader in the 70s, seriously. He created this idea of public interest work. Oh, well, you know what? Mass democracy is really hard. We've got corporations abusing us. Government is in cahoots. It's all corrupt. But it's really hard to get people out in the streets. But anyways, people go to law school, go to grad school. They're really smart and they got time. They'll just act in the public interest. They'll file the lawsuits against corporations that are polluting the river. They'll push for greater regulation on Capitol Hill. Leave it to them. They have the resources. It sounds really good. But it's actually contemptuous of democracy. Ultimately, and I think part of what happened over the course of the 20th century is liberalism went from what it was in the New Deal when it was about turning out a huge electoral coalition, stayed that way roughly until the 60s, but then increasingly has become, as we all know, Democratic Party really represents college educated people, and the polarization of our parties now is really around class and college degrees. I just think actually, again, transgender history is a part of replacing a transsexual left. It's not that there never was a transsexual left. There was. But it was replaced. That's my overall sense of that.

Yeah.

Christoph Hanssmann: Thank you. It's terribly depressing, but very useful.

Jules Gill-Peterson: Wouldn't you rather know than not know though? [Laughter]

Christoph Hanssmann: Maybe one more question. I mean, we didn't hear that much about the kind of constitutional claim piece, but it's the title. I'm interested there. [Laughter]

Jules Gill-Peterson: Sorry.

Christoph Hanssmann: I mean, I was interested, actually in the very outset at which you mentioned that the conservatives are honest. Conservatives are honest about, they're saying what they mean, and that's that. It's important to pay attention to the trans liberalism. I definitely buy the second piece. I'm not sure I buy the first, and that's where I'm actually a little curious. I'm going to try and link these. One of the things that I into it is that there's actually not a whole ton of conservatives that just feel so deeply and strongly about transsexuals and transness in general, that it has become a life obsession in the way that we are made to think that it does. That's the message that I do hear from conservatives is that there is a deep care about the crisis of transsexuality. But it doesn't really feel like that's what it's about to me. I mean, it's not that it's not about that. That's definitely there. It's threaded throughout. But to me, it feels like a way to gain consensus on dismantling austerity. It's an organizing tool. I actually don't know if that part is honest. I don't think they say that part out loud. I think that brings me to the question about the constitutional claims. I am really interested in thinking through winability and what would actually bring about the material conditions for everyone to have access to transition, let alone housing, education, healthcare, et cetera. But slash and we've seen time and time again, both through the stories that you've told and through some of the grapplings that you've done through your writing about the failures of the Scomitte case. I'm curious about focusing on constitutional law as a place that will actually yield those things given what we know about law, never doing what it says it's going to do. I wonder if you could just speak to that and maybe draw the thread between.

Jules Gill-Peterson: Totally, yeah. What a great thank you, Chris. I appreciate that. That's partially also why I didn't want to give this talk just because I really feel convinced by lawyers. Here's the short short of it. The Equal Protection Clause, part of the 14th Amendment, best amendment to the Constitution which we only have thanks to the bravery of freed people during the reconstruction, who were demanding political equality, but also gave us birthright citizenship, a number of other. Amy but you know the 14th Amendment. It's the most litigated clause in the Constitution. Also, conservatives have been trying to take it out of the Constitution and water it down since 1866. Part of the story of Frances Thompson, the only two things you really need to know are that, one, she was a woman by transition, not by birth, and she was part of 1866 race riot in Memphis, where a white police mob attacked Memphis black neighborhood and she was raped along with five other free women. She testified before Congress, made a claim of equal protection. If the United States claims to care about white women, what's the word virtue? Then it has to guarantee the virtue of Black women too. Congress was very moved by her testimony. It was national news, all over the papers. It helped convinced people in Congress to adopt the 14th Amendment. In the strain of judicial reasoning where it matters what the context of the adoption of something was, well, we got one person who was there. Thank you, Frances. What an absolute gift. Ten years later, she was arrested for cross dressing and outed as male. Reactionaries who've been spending that 10 years trying to end reconstruction. This was an election year, her outing was again, national news. She became an issue in the 1876 election. People were calling the Republicans the Frances Thompson Party, and the story went like this. she's not a woman, she's male. It's 1876, most Americans do not believe a man could be raped. Therefore, she must have lied. She must have perjured to Congress. Therefore, isn't all of reconstruction premised on a lie? A conspiracy against good, white, liberal Northerners. My point there is, that's the

invention by the way, of political trans misogyny in this country because right after that, you start seeing black transition, passing women being picked up for cross dressing everywhere. But also, it means that this amendment, this clause in the Constitution is also tied to the history of transition, but in a struggle for political racial equality. That's great. But I totally agree with lawyers I've talked to who are much smarter than me about the law. I mean, we're there's just an absolutely zero chance of winning on equal. Even if we had gone back in time and did skirmy with exactly the argument I and other people think we should have made, we would have lost. We still would have lost. It's okay. Conservatives deserve a lot of blame for the real things that they did. Not letting them off the hook. I think there are maybe other parts. You could look up this legal scholar, De Dagan, who I just absolutely adore. She has ideas for other parts of the Constitution. Especially maybe the First Amendment, but also we could really be using the Americans with Disability Act. It's probably one of the best laws we have to try and protect medical transition. But courts, I doubt it. I honestly I doubt it. What I've learned from studying the history of conservative judicial work, the federalist society, and so on, first of all, they had a lot of money. Second of all, they had a lot of patience. When Robert Bork was up for a Supreme Court seat in the 80s, it was as an originalist, he was ridiculed as an extremist. Now the court is by far, super majority originalists. That took four decades. I think for me, the legal stuff is actually really not that urgent. I'm just saying if lawyers and other academics want to spend some of the time we have doing the stuff that we are trained to do, we could start putting our wish list. Where would you like the law to be in 2025 years? Maybe we'll get there then. But it's a political battle in the interim where everything has to transpire. That's all, I would say, to me, it's really amazing through the accident of history that the US Constitution, I actually think really does guarantee the right to transition. It's, like, not true of most constitutions. I don't think you have to have a good constitution for a transition to be practical and also, a right to transition is useless if it's not actually materially enforceable. It could be really useful. But ultimately, to me, I see that as sort of a horizon goal. I just actually think it's genuinely something that scholars should do with their time. Like, that's what they're trained to do, legal scholars, other scholars. That's why I've devoted some of my time to it. But for me, it's far less important than what I talked about in this talk, which is, like, I think liberalism has a lot more work to do in the meantime. Also, we just do not have the courage collectively. We don't know how to flex that muscle, the courage to defend transsexuality. This is really hard. I genuinely mean it. It's really hard. I think for most people to feel good. About teenagers changing their sex. I genuinely mean it. I think we really have to be honest about that. It really raises a lot of questions that we do not know how to answer. I think part of it is that dysphoria also is such a profound and extreme form of suffering. We feel humiliated by our helplessness to solve it. In a world where everything, all of our social goods have been completely privatized, I mean, this is part of the thing. I think that families that are raising transsexual kids that they're letting the enormous strain and pressure they're under. I mean, that is not what families are not designed to do that. I think it's a beautiful transformative thing that families are doing it. But I just think the truth is if we go back to that we just pick up on one other thing you said. I think the great insight of that 1960s moment and what sociologists have picked up on then they're not wrong. Dysphoria triggers severe social and economic problems and psychological and medical problems for people. I think ultimately what the history of transgender liberalism tells me is that we cannot make those personal responsibilities. Actually, the individual is not the appropriate unit for dealing with that, what do people need when they're transitioning? You need so much support. It is really hard to do without a loving family. It is really hard, even with loving friends and partners. This is really hard. Even if you have good health insurance. It really is. [Applause] I mean, you're all going to get me excited. Even with good health insurance, let's say you've got your surgery schedule. First of all, how are you going to deal with waiting two years? I calculated at the end of my transition. I was like, I spent six years getting four surgeries, spacing out. When can I take enough time off to recover? How am I going to go up for? It was excruciating. It turned me into a totally messed up person. The main problem people confront, even in Canada, where I'm from, where technically the surgery might be covered. Can you just pay rent for three months while you're recovering from surgery? I mean, these are the real issues. I think,

ultimately, transsexuality is a call and dysphoria is a call to the fact that the society we live in is just totally ****** up. We need to have what I really think transsexuals need more than just legal access to transgender healthcare or equal access or whatever is they need money. [Applause] I'll say, I just was talking to my mom about this because I left the country for vaginoplasty, was the best decision I ever made. I did medical tourism, which is very bad or whatever. I had an amazing experience in a different country that was not this one. But I was saying to my mother the other day. I was like, can I do this without crying? She flew across the world to be with me. I cannot tell you how important that has been for my healing in the year since surgery. By the way, we also don't talk about what happens to people after surgery. It was really hard. Ask anyone. Well, don't force people to talk about it. Don't ask anyone, but it's really hard. One of the things I was talking to her about it I was, most people don't have their mom there. But you know what? It's actually just really hard developmentally, not to have the first person you ever attached to, presumably, whoever that person is in your life. It's really hard. Why is the entire field of psychotherapy not interested in this problem. I just think dysphoria is really scary. I think part of the problem is that when people go to create transgender studies, transgender politics, it's people with dysphoria doing it. Ultimately, I hope everyone knows that everything I've said tonight is from a deep place of compassion. I have been through this **** myself. That's why I'm able to speak freely now because I think I have seen how much I have become an antagonist in my own life. How much transgender politics and ideas have hurt me and hurt other people that I love and how hard it is to deal with dysphoria honestly, with curiosity. Also, I can say it is possible to heal from its traumatizing effects. I actually think there is very few forms of human suffering that can be so extreme as what happens to transsexual women and yet can be cured. It's really rare. [Applause] We're sitting on a gold mine. We are sitting on something so amazing. I think it's just really hard to be able to claim that and to genuinely want to do something about it is really hard. Anyways, that was not the question you asked. [Laughter]

Christoph Hanssmann: Thank you. Anyone have any questions I'd like to ask? Right here.

Speaker 1: How do you intend to safeguard the political project that you're advocating from the same mistakes that so many people who have framed a very similar project have made before? How do we avoid making the mistake that they make, which is actually harming transsexual right to transition?

Jules Gill-Peterson: Well, that's a fabulous question. I think the difference for me is that, as we talked a little bit about. Transsexual, the way I'm using is not a diagnostic term. It's not even a medical condition. It names a historical group of people who share a common experience of downward mobility. All these social and economic, psychological and medical issues that are, as you were alluding to, not really unrelatable. There are plenty of people who have other kinds of experiences who are also natural political allies in a mode of solidarity. In that sense, I think there's different ways to do it. By the way, if I knew how to push liberalism in a different direction, I would be relaxing on vacation on an island somewhere. I don't know. I'm a historian. I really can't predict the future. I think this is a really serious problem though, is that liberalism, is profoundly disliked at this point, mainly because of its economic record and for the isolated expensive, lonely society it has overseen. That's unfortunately why populist conservatives are very attractive because they can shake things up, and people would like things to be shaken up. People are really miserable. In that sense, I think, transsexual misery, in some ways, is just one of many kinds of misery that could fuel good politics. I think in sort of the more specific question that you're asking. I mean, I have a somewhat different point of view. I think part of what my research has led me to understand better, is I don't know, and I didn't give a long explanation of how the medical arrangement ended up working in this period. But I don't think what was wrong. I think genuinely when people are transitioning, they need help. It's really hard to learn how to change your sex. I don't just mean how you will feel hormones and surgeries. It's really hard to learn how to fulfill any of the goals that you have for yourself functioning in the world. Also explore what you feel like you're allowed to do, overcome your shame and your guilt for wanting those things. I think that's really hard. I don't really think that the error of the clinics was that they

were forcing patients into a normative functioning. Those patients genuinely wanted help with their appearance. They genuinely wanted to get out of sex work. They genuinely wanted jobs. They wanted to complete high school. They wanted help with voice training, and they wanted help passing. They really did. The problem was that the clinic said, I'm not going to help you do that. You need to go out and do it yourself first. Then when you come back, if you've succeeded, then I know you deserve to medically transition. That was unimaginably cruel and wrong. It should have been the reverse. Well, how can I help you. Again, I think this falls under the much larger set of things. There are specific things, I think that dysphoria causes as a predicament for people. But I think part of the problem is that because clinicians created this very perverse bargain with their patients, they stayed relatively uninterested in those questions. They outsourced it. They said, go deal with your own problems on your, pull yourself up by your bootstraps. We don't have a robust literature, for example on how dysphoria differs between different groups of people who medically transition. There are some real obvious differences between some different groups, and we don't know that much about that. Therapists are not that great in general, but they're also not that great at working with these questions. Social services are not that great. We really just don't have very many tools, I think, for dealing with the questions that you're raising. To me, a starting place would be to think about the status problem or the class problem. The insecurity triggered by transition. Again, I don't have nostalgia for this time period. But I do have a lot of respect, I think, for that first generation of transsexual women who were very brave, and we actually owe everything to them. We would not have any gender furb care if it was not for them. It's I mean, they all had happy endings, but I think they showed us, they proved that you could treat dysphoria, and that had never been proven before in this country. I just think in some ways, there's a lot for us to come back to and think about in what we failed and got wrong, sort of the finale, so to speak that you're talking about, Chris. That's sort of that. I think at the end of the day, part of what I would call for more broadly is just sort of a relaxation of identity based. There's no scarcity of identities. I actually think gender based identities are just a form of class distinction. People are welcome to do them. You're welcome. I don't see that as actually much of a problem, is they're just ultimately sort of personal decisions. But I think contextualizing them that way would relieve a lot of stress and anxiety that people feel where it feels like these things are so opposed to one another. Sometimes their interests are opposed, but I think it would be pretty easy to get to a place where they didn't have to be.

Christoph Hanssmann: Dr. Chris Henzen and Dr. Jules Gill-Peterson, thank you so much. [Applause]